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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

FROM : John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Increased Surveillance Detection Training
Requirements, FY 1982 and FY 1983

1. It has become increasingly clear that, principally for lack of adequate resources, our field bound personnel are being insufficiently trained in surveillance detection. Exceptions are those officers being assigned to very critical areas such as the bloc, who take the SE Division course, or those who have the good fortune to take CID's 10-12 day program. Given the facts that surveillance detection is a most critical tradecraft skill and that operating climates for CIA throughout the world continue to worsen (and, finally, because we are in the process of preparing the operations officer corps which will take us through what promise to be two most challenging decades), it is essential that we come to grips with this resource-intensive training requirement in an effective way.

2. It is of great importance to the Directorate of Operations that the Covert Instruction Division of OTE be provided additional personnel and financial resources which will permit it to give surveillance detection training on an expanded scale, one which can meet our annual needs by FY 1983. Essentially, this would require doubling the number of students who can be given surveillance detection training this year and doubling it again the following year; i.e., from some or so programs in FY 1982 to programs in FY 1983.

3. It is understood that this build-up will take some months to complete and that in FY 1982 there certainly will be some difficulty doubling the program capacity of CID in surveillance detection. Nonetheless, with turning out an average case officers per year who have received only a week's introduction to surveillance detection, and with many of our middle-grade officers and field managers without any prior surveillance training whatever, it is important that we make a major effort to close the gap between what CID can do today and what our genuine needs are in the months and years ahead.

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25X1 4. In the process of studying this matter, there has been some discussion of the resource requirements which CID would require to conduct this training on an expanded basis without reducing the quality of their very good program. For your own planning purposes, tentative estimates suggest that a full program would require three additional instructors, some ten CTs at any time on brief interim assignments, authority to pay overtime to employees from other components who work with CID on this program after hours, a modern and secure surveillance communications capability and funds as high as [] per year to cover increased salary, travel, equipment, safehouse and vehicular costs. As tentative as these figures may be, they are indicative of both the challenge we face as well as the tangible reason why there has been reluctance earlier to undertake this program. Nonetheless, insofar as the DO's resources permit, we are prepared to support this program, especially from the personnel standpoint, and await your determination of the feasibility of expanding the CID capability.

John H. Stein

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